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BOOK REVIEWS
Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will, by John Martin Fischer. 
Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 184. $65.00 (cloth).
STEWART GOETZ, Ursinus College
This first-rate book consists of a collection of ten interesting papers, all but 
one of which has appeared elsewhere. Seven of the papers are authored 
by Fischer alone, and three are co-authored (the co-authors are Anthony 
Brueckner, Ruth Curl, and Daniel Speak). As the title accurately states, the 
papers concern (the meaning of) life, death, and free will.
I start where the book ends, with Fischer’s treatment of the meaning 
of life and free will. In the philosophy of action, Fischer is a compatibilist, 
and he believes the value of acting freely (or in a way as to be morally re-
sponsible) is the value of self-expression, which does not require alterna-
tive possibilities and is a kind of or akin to aesthetic value. Self-expression 
is the making of a certain kind of statement that has a distinctive narrative 
meaning and transforms our lives into stories. One way of summarizing 
Fischer’s view is to say that our lives have a narrative dimension of value/
meaning that is explained by our ability to act freely, and this entails that 
when we act freely we are engaged in a kind of artistic self-expression.
Narrative value/meaning, however, is not the primary form of value/
meaning. A person’s life also has the more basic moral and prudential 
forms of value/meaning, where both of these require our acting freely. 
If Fischer believes that prudential value/meaning (e.g., something like 
happiness) is the primary kind of value/meaning, then it would not be 
unnatural to conclude that he believes there is some single, fixed meaning 
to our lives that is, as it were, given and, perhaps, purposed. But Fischer 
seems to deny that this is the case. He insists that there is not a single story 
of our lives—a given narrative to which we add sentences, and there is 
no fundamental or privileged purpose or set of purposes (172). Though 
there is no fundamental or privileged purpose for our lives, Fischer be-
lieves (contrary to people like Bernard Williams) that immortality is not 
necessarily undesirable and might obtain, for all that we know. Thus, 
understanding our lives as narratives is compatible with a story without 
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an end (death, followed by an experiential blank, would be THE end). 
“Narrativity need not entail the necessity of endings” (146).
Given that this is the journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers, 
it is appropriate to contrast Fischer’s view of value/meaning with a dif-
ferent one that seems reasonable on its own terms and is compatible with 
theism. Let us concede Fischer’s list of the different kinds of value/mean-
ing but prioritize them in the following way in light of the possibility of 
immortality. Most fundamental is prudential value/meaning, where this 
is purposefully fixed for us by our Creator. Our prudential value/mean-
ing in its maximal form is our experience of perfect happiness (which, 
at a minimum, is a quality of existence that is pleasurable and excludes 
experiences of pain), which is the fulfillment of our Creator’s purpose for 
us as individuals. This understanding of prudential value/meaning seems 
to be at odds with Fischer’s because it excludes an idea that Fischer seems 
to endorse, which is that acting freely is part and parcel of well-being. 
Fischer says of someone who never acts freely that “his overall level of 
well-being is to be determined by simply adding his momentary welfare 
values” (151). An implication of this claim is that were this person to act 
freely, his doing so would itself become an additive component in the 
summation that yields his overall level of well-being. But this seems to 
be a mistake. As I will point out in the next paragraph, while it is reason-
able to hold that choosing freely (in the libertarian sense) is a necessary 
condition of experiencing one’s maximal level of well-being, it is wrong to 
maintain that acting freely (in any sense) is itself an additive component 
of that well-being.
What about moral value/meaning? On the account of value/meaning 
I have in mind (which, given constraints of space, is very vague), moral 
value/meaning is secondary in nature and arises out of the need for jus-
tice, where justice requires that only those who choose moral life plans 
fulfill the purpose for which they were created (only those who adopt 
moral life plans experience perfect happiness). Moreover, moral value/
meaning requires free will, but free will that is libertarian in nature. Nar-
rative value/meaning is, thus, tertiary in nature and a function of how 
we choose in the libertarian sense. Those who choose a moral way of life, 
which is one kind of narrative value/meaning, realize the maximal pru-
dential value/meaning for which they were created. Those who choose 
an immoral way of life, which is a second kind of narrative value/mean-
ing, fail to realize the maximal prudential value/meaning for which they 
were created.
Fischer believes that there is the appearance, but not the reality, of a 
conflict between the concepts of a narrativity and immortality (157–160). 
If a narrative must have an ending, then strictly speaking our lives can-
not be narrative stories that “end” with immortality, because immortal-
ity is something that never ends. Fischer responds that perhaps, strictly 
speaking, an immortal life cannot fit into a narrative framework that has a 
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narrative value/meaning as a whole. But an immortal life could have some-
thing much like narrative value/meaning insofar as the relevant temporal 
stages of that life could exhibit the defining characteristics of narrative 
value/meaning, even though there is no whole life-story with an ending. In 
this case, the whole would not have a property of its parts. In this context, 
Fischer states that an immortal life might be like “a series of novels with 
the same protagonist, like a mystery series with the same detective. Over 
time the detective’s character may change, but the changes can be organic; 
they need not be discontinuous” (158).
Because I am not committed to defending the reality of narrative value/
meaning, I am not bothered by the fact that the idea of immortality is in 
tension with that of narrative value/meaning. However, it seems to me 
that there is no need to hold (as Fischer seems to assume at this point, but 
see the next paragraph) that immortality (at least, immortality understood 
as perfect happiness) includes continued character development. I believe 
a more reasonable view of immortality sees it as a kind of existence in 
which a person’s moral character is perfected and needs no further im-
provement. Immortality is fundamentally a state of perfect happiness 
(well-being) wherein further development of moral character is otiose. If 
this is the case, then there is no moral narrative structure in the context of 
immortality.
Bernard Williams argues that if immortality involves a fixed (moral) 
character, then it will inevitably become boring and alienating (82). As 
Fischer points out, there is a distinction between self-exhausting and re-
peatable pleasures. A self-exhausting pleasure is one associated with an 
activity the performance of which terminates any further need to do it 
again. An example Fischer provides is of an activity that you desire to do 
just once to prove to yourself that you can do it:
Imagine . . . that you are somewhat afraid of heights, and you have been 
working hard to overcome this phobia. You form the goal of climbing Mt 
Whitney just to show yourself that you have overcome the fear—just to 
show yourself that you can control your life and overcome obstacles. Upon 
climbing the mountain, you may in fact be very pleased and proud. Indeed, 
you may be deeply satisfied. But also you may have absolutely no desire to 
climb Mt Whitney (or any other mountain) again. You have accomplished 
your goal, but there is no impetus toward repeating the relevant activity or 
the pleasure that issues from it. (85)
Although Fischer does not mention the following point in response to 
Williams, it does seem coherent to suppose that even if there were no other 
kind of pleasure than that which is self-exhausting, the intelligibility of the 
idea of perfect happiness would still not be undermined. What would be 
required for perfect happiness would be a potentially infinite number of 
unrepeatable activities each of which provided its subject with pleasure. 
And given that there is nothing incoherent in this concept, it would be 
possible for a person to be perfectly happy for eternity by means of the 
BOOK REVIEWS 87
performance of an unending series of unrepeatable activities with their 
accompanying self-exhausting pleasures.
But as Fischer notes, there is another kind of pleasure. There are repeat-
able pleasures:
Here an individual may well find the pleasure highly fulfilling and com-
pletely satisfying at the moment and yet wish to have more (i.e., to repeat 
the pleasure) at some point in the future (not necessarily immediately). 
Certain salient sensual pleasures leap immediately to mind: the pleasures 
of sex, of eating fine meals and drinking fine wines, of listening to beautiful 
music, of seeing great art, and so forth. . . . Given the appropriate distribu-
tion of such pleasures, it seems that an endless life that included some (but 
perhaps not only) repeatable pleasures would not necessarily be boring or 
unattractive. (85)
As Fischer goes on to point out, religious persons (and who is more 
likely to believe in perfect happiness than a religious person?) can expe-
rience not only repeatable pleasures of the sort just mentioned but also 
repeatable pleasures that come with the repeatable activities of worship 
of and thanks to God. Thanking God for the repeatable pleasures that He 
has granted is itself a source of additional pleasure.
I have focused in this review on the latter half of Our Stories in which 
Fischer treats at length the meaning of life and its relationship to free will. 
The first half of Our Stories focuses on death and whether it is bad, if there 
is no immortality or afterlife of any kind but only a permanent experien-
tial blank. Given that this review resembles a life without immortality in 
that it must have an end, I cannot do justice to the interesting issues that 
Fischer raises and addresses in his discussion of death. For now, it will 
have to suffice to say that Our Stories is a collection of first-rate essays that 
will leave the reader pondering many interesting and important issues 
related to concerns that we all share in virtue of our being human. The 
book is eminently readable and suitable for any course that deals with 
death and the meaning of life. I highly recommend it to anyone who is 
interested in reading thoughtful essays about these topics.
Justice: Rights and Wrongs, by Nicholas Wolterstorff. Princeton University 
Press, 2010. Pp. 416. $25 (paperback).
ADAM BARKMAN, Redeemer University College
Nicholas Wolterstorff has been thinking and writing about justice almost 
from the very beginning of his career and, like a fine wine, his thought, as 
expressed in Justice: Rights and Wrongs, has nicely aged. Gone are some of 
the rough edges and imbalances that characterized his first book on jus-
tice, Until Justice and Peace Embrace. Here is the work of a philosopher who 
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has, it seems, read everything, understood all that he has read, and, with 
characteristic passion for doing all things Christianly, taken seriously the 
Reformed injunction to view all theories of justice through biblical spec-
tacles. His theory of justice is original, stimulating and valuable, though, 
as to be expected given these, it is also frustrating and controversial. This 
book will make you think.
Justice is divided into three parts: a brief history of rights (he calls it the 
archeology of rights), the goods to which we have rights, and having a 
right to a good. Although he touches on the extremely important relation-
ship between justice and love, he has relegated the balance of this topic to 
a forthcoming sequel.
He begins the first part of the book by insisting on an explicitly Chris-
tian approach to justice and then continues on to distinguish between 
primary and retributive justice (ix), and, somewhat originally, two basic 
theories of primary justice: justice as “right order” and justice as “inherent 
rights” (30). I had to read this section more than once to appreciate this 
important distinction since until then, I had always assumed that right 
order requires a theory of inherent rights, and in this way, found myself 
to be somewhere between these two even at the outset.
As the title suggests, Wolterstorff argues that justice is best thought of 
as inherent rights, wherein “rights are normative social relationships” (4) 
and inherent rights are rights that are natural or non-conferred—even, 
a bit shockingly given Wolterstorff’s Reformed background, “by God or 
by some socially transcendent norm extrinsic [to the rights bearer]” (10). 
God, Wolterstorff makes clear from the outset, isn’t beyond the scope of 
justice or rights-talk; indeed, a correct understanding of God is essential 
to a correct understanding of justice. Nevertheless, one of the weakest 
aspects of the book is that we never get a perfectly clear, perfectly laid 
out definition of justice which we could hold on to throughout the entire 
book. Given the depth and breadth of the material covered, this would 
have been extremely helpful.
One of the chief goals of Justice is to disabuse the notion of rights as pre-
sented by right order theorists. In the spirit of redeeming creational goods, 
Wolterstorff insists that “the practices of honoring and claiming rights . . . 
have been distorted,” not that rights themselves are a distortion of justice 
(7). To prove his case, he endeavors to expose the problems in the story of 
rights as told by right order theorists, who typically point to fourteenth-
century nominalism as the origin of human rights theory. Though not 
a historian of philosophy, Wolterstorff does an adequate job of tracing 
rights-talk back past the Middle Ages to the Church Fathers and finally 
into the New and Old Testaments. Ultimately, Wolterstorff wants to argue 
for inherent human rights because he thinks the Bible supports such. It 
is in these sections that Wolterstorff is at both his strongest and weakest.
On the one hand, his critique of right order theorists is outstanding. In 
my mind he is best, not so much in showing that right order theorists are 
totally wrong, but rather that any tolerable right order theory also needs 
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a theory of inherent human rights. Reading his critique of Plato, Aristotle, 
Aquinas, the O’Donovans is much like waking up from a dream: until 
that moment, these seemed so convincing, so all-encompassing, that their 
flaws—clear now—were difficult, if not impossible, to see: duty was all 
that mattered and rights were simply not addressed (though the notion 
always haunted these theories). Wolterstorff is a splash of cold water on 
the face.
On the other hand, Wolterstorff, not being a historian, sometimes seems 
to push his case, especially when trying to find inherent human rights in 
the Old Testament. For example, while trying to refute O’Donovan’s claim 
that the Old Testament typically refers to justice as rectification, not pri-
mary justice, I find Wolterstorff a bit desperate (71). However, in the end I 
still think he proves his case, mostly by asking, and then in careful detail, 
analyzing, three key questions: (1) “Is there any recognition of Israel’s 
writings of the recipient-side of the moral order?” (2) “Is there any recog-
nition of the worth of persons and of human beings?” and (3) “Is there any 
indication that that worth is seen as grounding how a person or human 
has a right to be treated?” (91). The Israelites, Wolterstorff insists, saw that 
it was unjust to deprive God of that to which He has a right (namely, to be 
worshipped, to be treated as the most important thing), and they also saw 
that by murdering another, for example, they understood themselves to 
be violating the other person’s inherent right—because they are made in 
the image of God—not to be murdered.
Convinced that primary justice and justice as rights is biblical, Wolter-
storff then moves on to refute the false story—told by Nygren and Hau-
erwas—which would oppose love to justice or would see love replacing 
justice. Inasmuch as Jesus came not to abolish the Law and the Prophets, 
but to perfect them, Wolterstorff argues that Jesus’s conception of love 
and mercy presupposes and builds on justice: “Forgiveness has to be 
justice-alert; it cannot be justice blind” (105). Of course, he is far from 
original here (Shakespeare in Measure for Measure said everything better 
than Wolterstorff does on this subject), but this is an old truth that has 
been distorted in recent years, and so this voice is badly needed.
In the second part of the book, Wolterstorff discusses the goods to which 
we have rights. Central to this is a proper conception of the good life. Thus, 
Wolterstorff begins with an extremely detailed critique of eudaimonism, 
or rather, three forms of eudaimonism: (1) the experimentally satisfying 
life, (2) the happy life and (3) the flourishing life. Without getting into all 
the details, I found his critique of these a mixed bag, though, like trick or 
treating in a poor neighborhood, the mixture is more bad than good. He 
is at his best when questioning the Stoic’s distinction between a “good” 
and a “preferable,” but at his worst, in my opinion, when arguing that 
eudaimonism in any of its forms cannot find room for the inherent worth 
of persons or things. He spends an entire chapter trying—but failing in 
my view—to expose Augustine’s supposed break from eudaimonism and 
then another chapter arguing with Aquinas (and in a related matter, with 
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Nussbaum) that eudaimonism is incompatible with Christ’s love com-
mand; he says in no small voice, “No version of eudaimonism has room 
for compassion” (212).
In place of eudaimonism, Wolterstorff forwards, in his view, a more 
biblical alternative, which he calls eirenéism—a theory of the good life 
emphasizing vulnerability and sociality: “My well-being is constituted in 
good measure by the actions and restraints from action of others. It is in 
their hands” (226). This is an attractive alternative, and certainly gives un-
comfortable Christian eudaimonists a reasonable (even if not an irresist-
ible) alternative. Yet many unaddressed questions remain: Is this theory of 
the good life true of God, who is the perfection of happiness? Is His nature 
changeable and contingent on how others treat Him? Can we say that God 
is less happy if He is wronged? Wolterstorff’s theory would suggest yes, 
and he may be right. But I, personally, need more convincing and so hope 
this will be expanded on in the sequel.
In part three, Wolterstorff develops his conception of having a right—
more specifically, a moral right—to a good. This part is very technical, 
but rewards careful reading. Drawing on legal theory (which surprisingly 
enriches this philosophical discourse), Wolterstorff qualifies and defends 
a “weak Hohfeld thesis,” which states that for every claim-right there is 
a correlative full-cognitive duty (257). Connected with this, Wolterstorff 
gives us a powerful (and refreshing, coming from a Reformed Christian) 
critique of divine command theory: “though God’s commands do indeed 
place us under obligation, their doing so presupposes the normative 
context of a standing obligation on our part to obey such commands as 
God may issue to us. [The divine command theory] also proves not to be 
satisfactory . . . because a corollary of that standing obligation on our part 
is the standing right on God’s part to our obedience to such commands as 
God may issue” (281).
His final chapters include a very nice discussion on the nature and 
grounding of human worth (here Wolterstorff’s early work on ontology 
pays off), the important question of whether human rights can be ground-
ed on anything but theism (his critique of secularism is convincing, but, as 
is typical of western philosophers, he doesn’t address non-western alter-
natives), and the nature of the imago Dei (which he sees as the property of 
being loved by God equally and permanently and it is this that grounds 
inherent human rights).
In Justice: Rights and Wrongs, Wolterstorff is at once fair to his inter-
locutors, and unafraid of exploring new ways of understanding justice, 
especially from an unapologetically biblical Christian perspective. Al-
though I see this book as essential reading for all Christian ethicists, I fear 
that because it is so dense and technical (especially the third part), it will 
have limited readership. This is unfortunate since much of what Wolter-
storff says desperately needs to be heard by theologians and Christians 
in general.
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Will as Commitment and Resolve: An Existential Account of Creativity, Love, 
Virtue, and Happiness, by John Davenport. New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2007. Pp. xxiv + 706.
ANTHONY RUDD, St. Olaf College
This is an extremely ambitious book. What enables it to work is that, for all 
the breadth indicated in the sub-title, it is focussed on a fairly specific issue; 
the understanding of willing as “projective motivation.” This turns out to 
have very wide implications for a range of topics in moral psychology, 
ethics, the philosophy of mind and—a bit more tangentially—the philoso-
phy of religion. Davenport works out his account of the will and its im-
plications in great detail and with meticulous care, developing it through 
conversation with an enormously wide range of philosophical (but also 
psychological and literary) texts. He moves easily back and forth between 
discussions of more analytic and more Continental philosophers (though 
mostly the former) and has extensive sections on historical figures—espe-
cially Plato and Aristotle, but also Scotus, Kant and others. Although he 
describes the book as a contribution to the renewal of existentialist thought 
(and sometimes describes his as “the existentialist” view), he does not 
discuss any of the canonical existentialist authors at length. However, the 
influence of Kierkegaard (about whom Davenport has written extensively 
elsewhere) is pervasive, though mostly in the background. The range of 
reference, but also the authority with which Davenport is able to write 
about such a wide range of texts, is most impressive. Readers daunted by 
the formidable length of the book may well be tempted to skip some of the 
detailed discussions of the literature (and the literature on the literature); 
but the conversational method is crucial to the book. Davenport’s own 
quite distinctive and original position is one developed through dialogue 
with other thinkers, by sifting and sorting out what is and is not valuable 
in the existing contributions. And in doing this, Davenport is consistently 
careful, fair-minded and unpolemical.
Davenport introduces his subject matter by saying that “[t]his book is 
about the will in what can loosely be called its ‘heroic’ sense, as committed 
striving or passionate resolve.” But this, he quickly adds, is not something 
rare or marginal; “strength of will [is] the backbone of every distinctively 
human life. . . volition is personal resolve, or choice that is motivated by 
the agent’s self-assertive commitment to final goals and ends” (4). For 
all its centrality (as he claims) in ordinary life, Davenport notes that the 
“striving” will has not only been regarded with suspicion by various (es-
pecially Eastern, but also Western) religious traditions (29–37) but has also 
been generally neglected in the Western philosophical tradition. Natural-
istic thinkers like Hobbes and Freud have dismissed the idea of the will 
altogether; on their view, we are moved to action by our strongest desires, 
with reason (sometimes) calculating the best means to the desired end; 
there is no need to postulate a further faculty of will in order to explain 
92 Faith and Philosophy
action (47–49). On these views, the subject, considered as an agent, rather 
than a stage through which causal processes pass, drops out of the picture 
entirely. This helps to show, by contrast, why Davenport wants to make 
the will central to his understanding of human agency. To have a will is 
to be able to set one’s own goals, to exercise a certain kind of freedom, 
and thus to count as morally responsible. It is worth noting though that 
Davenport does not think the account of the will he offers in this book 
commits him to a libertarian view of free will (see 83; 406–417). Not that 
he is committed to compatibilism either; the whole issue is set aside to be 
dealt with in future work.
Even views of human agency less reductive than those of the Hobbes-
ian tradition still tend, Davenport complains, to “motivationally thin” 
theories of the will. “The thin concept of willing as the practical process 
of forming intentions and purposes can be interpreted in more minimal-
ist or more robust ways. . . . But none of them sees practical willing as 
directly involved in controlling, shaping or forming our motives them-
selves” (79). Non-Hobbesian theories can allow for a gap between desire 
and action which the will is able to fill; but they do not allow for the 
kind of “existentially thick” willing by which, according to Davenport, 
we form our characters; which has the role of “shaping the ethos of a 
person” (79). More specifically, he argues that we should reject what he 
calls the “transmission principle,” accepted by “virtually all” contempo-
rary theories of motivation (88). According to this principle, “volition . . . 
does not generate any new motivation; it only transmits motivation” from 
our “prepurposive motives” (those “psychological attitudes that incline 
us to form intentions”) “into the intended purposes” (87). By contrast, 
on Davenport’s view, the “striving will” is capable of “projective motiva-
tion,” that is, it can formulate goals which are not based on pre-existing 
motivational states. We become motivated to pursue the goal because we 
have willed to do so, not vice versa. The tendency of modern philoso-
phy to reject this idea—or to not even see it as a possibility—Davenport 
traces to the ancient Greeks, in particular to the “eudaimonistic tradition,” 
represented by both Plato and Aristotle. Accordingly, Davenport turns 
from his examination of contemporary theories of action and will to a 
detailed study of Plato and Aristotle (and their recent commentators and 
defenders) which occupies most of chapters 4–8. He attributes to both 
Greek philosophers the idea that desire has an “erosaic” structure; that 
is, desire (eros in the broadest sense) is a striving to gain what we lack, 
or to actualise what is present in us as potential. Happiness (eudaimonia) 
is the satisfying of such desire, and human action is to be explained as a 
quest for the good which we feel ourselves (either clearly or dimly and 
confusedly) to lack. Davenport thus presents his conception of projective 
motivation as the alternative to the eudaimonistic tradition which contin-
ues to dominate the philosophical scene.
Davenport’s argument against this formidable tradition has two main 
stages. In the first (which occupies Part Two of the book), he tries to show 
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that eudaimonism is unable to deal with a fundamental paradox, that of 
formal egoism. This is related to the familiar paradox of material egoism, 
that someone who desires only his/her own happiness is unlikely to find 
it; happiness comes as a by-product of doing things which one cares about 
for their own sake. Davenport does not accuse Plato, Aristotle, or mod-
ern eudaemonists like MacIntyre of material egoism. But their theories 
are nonetheless formally egoistic in that they take motivation to be based 
on desire for what we lack. For instance, friendship is a crucial part of 
eudaimonia. If I lack friends, I will be unhappy, so I am motivated to de-
velop friendships. But a genuine friendship is one in which I care about 
my friend for his/her own sake. The happiness I get from the friendship is 
a by-product of aiming, not at the happiness the friendship will bring me, 
but at the good of my friend. The point is, of course, a familiar one and, 
as Davenport fully recognises, the eudaemonists clearly want to avoid 
material egoism. But, he argues, they are unable to show how genuinely 
unselfish activity is compatible with their erosaic account of motivation, 
whereby what motivates me is always my desire for my good. This argu-
ment is developed through an impressively thorough and careful survey 
(quite impossible to summarise here!) of attempts to avoid the paradox, 
both by the classical eudaemonist authors, and by contemporary com-
mentators or followers. (Contemporaries discussed include Annas, Kraut, 
Cooper, MacIntyre, Sherman, Hursthouse, and Watson.)
The second main stage of Davenport’s argument (which occupies Part 
Three of the book) focuses more on the positive case to be made for his 
own “existential” view. This is still an argument against eudaimonism, 
though, as it consists in the enumeration and description of various psy-
chological phenomena that cannot (so Davenport claims) be explained in 
eudaemonist terms, but which demonstrate the reality of the “striving” 
will and projective motivation. These include agapaistic love; “radical 
evil” (by which Davenport here means evil that is done simply for its own 
sake, and not for any benefit—however perverse—that it may bring the 
evildoer); acting for the sake of duty (justice); acting for the sake of certain 
ideals or goals (broadly ethical, but non-deontic); and pursuing meaning-
ful but not specifically ethical projects that are not based on pre-existing 
desires. The method here is broadly phenomenological; putative exam-
ples of projective motivation are described (often with the help of literary 
and cinematic illustrations) and various philosophical and psychological 
reflections on them considered, with the aim of showing that they really 
cannot be understood in eudaimonistic terms and must be accepted at 
face-value as instances of projective willing.
In the course of making this argument, Davenport sketches a very in-
teresting historical backdrop to his account. Although on his view eudai-
monism has dominated the Western philosophical tradition, he notes that 
it has not been unchallenged. Davenport traces a rival counter-tradition 
back to Plato (in the Timaeus) and the Neoplatonists (287–303). This starts 
with a puzzle about divine creation. If all motivation is based on a felt 
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lack, what motive could God (who lacks nothing) have had for creating 
a world apart from Him? To deal with that problem, philosophers and 
theologians were forced to abandon the erosaic account of motivation, at 
least in the case of God; and could then use God’s free (non-need-based) 
generosity as the model for us to imitate in agape. Davenport also draws 
our attention to Scotus’s postulation (in opposition to Aquinas’s eudai-
monistic model) of a non-need-based will to justice, which he sees as the 
precursor to Kant’s radically anti-eudaimonistic deontology (see chapter 
11, passim). But he criticises both Scotus and Kant for seeing projective 
willing at work only in the deontological context and not more broadly. 
Similarly, Levinas is praised for seeing the ethical response to the other as 
radically distinct from any eudaimonistic concern, but criticised for seeing 
this as something totally different from the normal structure of motiva-
tion. On Davenport’s view, projective willing is ubiquitous, appearing not 
only in ethical contexts—and indeed sometimes (in cases of radical evil) 
in anti-ethical ones.
A final crucial stage in Davenport’s argument, treated most fully in 
the final chapter, though adumbrated in various places before that, is to 
reject the Sartrian existentialism that would take projective willing to be 
ultimately arbitrary. It might seem that if my choice of some project is 
not based on any need or antecedent desire within me, then it must be 
baseless—something I have chosen for no reason, and although I might 
equally well have chosen the opposite. Davenport rejects this dilemma, 
though. On his view, my willing x may be based on a perception of the 
value or worth of x, even though I had no need or desire for x. I am neither 
pushed by my need for x, nor drawn irresistibly by the goodness of x. I can 
freely (though in a sense that is not necessarily libertarian) will x for the 
reason that it is good, even though I could also choose not to will it. This 
view is expounded and defended, with great subtlety and characteristic 
thoroughness, through a close engagement with Harry Frankfurt’s work. 
In chapter 13, Davenport argues that Frankfurt’s account of caring comes 
close in many ways to his own account of the will, but in chapter 14 he 
shows that Frankfurt’s view that our cares are not based on the worth of 
what we care about, but must simply be accepted as brute psychological 
facts, is untenable. This analysis of Frankfurt’s subjectivism—at once very 
sympathetic and highly critical—is the best I know and is by itself well 
worth the price of admission to the book.
The length of the book will no doubt be off-putting to some potential 
readers. But although parts of this remarkably wide-ranging study can 
be appreciated in relative isolation from the main argument, the book as 
a whole repays a full reading. (It should be noted, incidentally, that the 
book is written in a very clear and readable style.) Some judicious pruning 
might not have hurt, but both of Davenport’s main arguments had to be 
developed at length. Neither the paradox of eudaimonism nor the posi-
tive phenomenology of projective willing could have been presented as a 
simple knock-down argument. The former requires a careful examination 
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of a wide range of attempts to answer the problem; the latter requires the 
putative instances of projective willing to be described in rich phenom-
enological detail. Inevitably, there will be much for readers to criticise and 
disagree about; it will be for each reader to decide whether Part Two leaves 
any viable option still open to the defender of eudaimonism and whether 
Part Three provides compelling evidence for the reality of projective will-
ing in Davenport’s sense. But I think there is no doubt that Davenport has 
made a compelling case and has presented in rich detail a powerful alter-
native to a deeply entrenched way of thinking. And whether or not one 
ultimately agrees with him, I think no reader could fail to learn much from 
his painstaking analyses. This is a remarkable and wonderfully thought-
provoking book.
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In this ambitious work, Mark Robson attempts to unseat a venerable 
philosophical tradition of understanding God’s creatio ex nihilo widely 
held since its seminal articulation by Leibniz, one framed in modal terms 
according to which creation consists in the actualization of a determinate 
possible world. The ontological assumption for most modal theories 
whose formal semantics are rooted in the Leibnizian idiom of “possible-
worlds” is that all possible objects are completely determinate individu-
als. Thus, although I have actually composed this on a laptop, I might 
have composed it on a desktop. As a way the world could have been, this 
possibility is general, for I have not specified whether the desktop would 
have been a PC or a Mac, or what software I would have used, and so on. 
But this possibility is not thereby indeterminate, for there is a fact of the 
matter about what might have been the case as regards each of these fur-
ther specifications, as well as innumerable other ones. Any one maximally 
specified and logically consistent description (while in practice impossible 
to render explicit) would tell us exactly one way that the world logically 
could have been—a possible world. Having not fully specified the state 
of affairs of my having composed this review on a desktop, my asser-
tion of the general possibility therefore includes many such determinate 
possibilities, thereby expressing a range of possible worlds. Each possible 
desktop in this range, as an exponent of a different possible world, is a 
fully determinate individual possible object.
According to those philosophical theologians in the Leibnizian tradition 
of modal ontology (and its formalized semantics post-Kripke), it is just 
this sort of determinacy about possibilia that characterizes God’s exhaus-
tive knowledge prior to creation. God’s creation of the world was simply 
